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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In  the  spring  of  1988,  two  events  concerning  the  European  Community  stirred 
politicians,  business  people  and  scientific  researchers.  The  Brussels 
summit  of  February  of  that  year  removed  a  number  of  major  obstacles  to 
further  progress  of  the  European  integration  process  through  agreements  on 
the  financing  of  the  Community,  limits  on  agricultural  spending  and  the 
doubling  of  the  so-called  structural  funds  {regional  fund,  social  fund  and 
guidance  section  of  the  European  Agricultural  Guidance  and  Guarantee 
Fund).  This  made  headway  for  an  increase  in  the  speed  with  which  the 
measures  needed  to  complete  the  EC  internal  market  along  the  lines  spelled 
out  in  the  1985  White  Paper  {Commission  of  the  EC,  1985)  were  adopted.  By 
June  1989,  over  50  per  cent  of  the  programme  of  279  measures  was  approved 
by  the  Counci 1  {Commission  of  the  EC,  1989a).  This  included  important 
measures  in  the  areas  of  capital  movements,  public  procurement,  banking 
services and  the  mutual  recognition  of  university diplomas.  The  integration 
process  did  not  stop  at  the  internal  market.  On  the  basis  of  a  report  by 
the  Committee  for  the  Study  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  {  1989),  the 
European  Counci 1  decided  at  the  Madrid  summit  of  June  1989  to  embark  on 
stage  1 of  the  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  on  the  1st  of  July,  1990.  The 
obstacles  removed  in  February  1988  thus  provided  a  significant  political 
impetus  to  the  process  of  European  integration. 
Shortly  after  the  Brussels  summit,  the  results  were  published  of  a  major 
study  into what  was  called  the 
11Cost  of  non-Europe ..  {Commission  of  the  EC, 
1988a).  This  study  not  only  provided  a  detailed  economic  analysis  of  the 
sectoral  impact  of  most  aspects  of  the  completion  of  the  internal  market, 
but  also  tried  to  give  an  overall  quantitative  estimate  of  the 
11Cost  of 
non-Europe
11
,  which,  in  terms  of  integration  theory,  may  be  put  equivalent 
to  the  gains  from  further  integration.  Thus,  even  though  other  research  had 
attempted  to  analyse  comprehensively  the  impact  of  the  completion  of  the 
White  Paper  {cf.  Pelkmans  and  Winters,  1988),  this study,  most  widely  known 
as  the  Cecchini  report,  was  the  first  attempt  at  global  quantification. 
Two,  complementary,  approaches  were  followed  with  a  view  to  estimating  the 
gains  from  the  internal  market.  On  the  basis  of  a  microeconomic  approach -2-
using  partial  equilibrium analysis  possible welfare  gains  in  the  range  of 4 
1/4  - 6  1/2  per  cent  of  Community  GOP  were  calculated  (for  details  see 
Cawley  and  Davenport,  1988).  Since  this  approach  was  mainly  restricted  to 
calculations  concerning  changes  in  consumer  surplus  and  producer  surplus 
without  the  repercussions  for  other  macroeconomic  variables,  it  was 
complemented  by  a  macroeconomic  approach.  The  latter was  based  on  the  use 
of  dynamic  econometric  international  linkage  models:  the  HERMES  model  of 
the  European  Commission  and  the  INTERLINK  model  of  the  OECD.  The  results 
from  the  macroeconomic  model  calculations,  reproduced  in  Table  1,  indicated 
a  possible  medium-term  increase  in  GOP  of  4.5  %,  a  decrease  in  the  price 
level  of  6 % and  an  increase  in  employment  of  1.5  % equivalent  to  almost 
two  million  jobs  (for  more  details,  see  Catinat  et al.,  1988,  and  Catinat 
and  Italianer,  1988).  Further  use  of  the  budgetary  room  for manoeuvre  could 
increase  the  effect  on  GOP  to  7%  while  expanding  employment  by  5  million 
jobs  (cf.  Commission  of  the  EC,  1988a). 
Subsequent  to  the  Brussels  summit  and  the  publication  of  the  Cecchini 
report,  there  was  a  considerable  improvement  in  the  business  climate  in  the 
EC  and  elsewhere.  Most  economic  forecasts  dating  from  the  beginning  of  1988 
were  still  imbued  with  moderately  negative  expectations  about  possible 
detrimenta 1  effects  of  the  October  1987  stockmarket  events.  The  January 
1988  economic  forecasts  of  the  European  Commission,  for  instance,  foresaw  a 
volume  increase  for  Community  investment  in  equipment  in  1988  of  4.1% 
(Commission  of  the  EC,  1988b).  This  forecast  was  increased  throughout  the 
year  to  end  up  with  a  realisation  of  9.3%  (Commission  of  the  EC,  1989b), 
thus  more  than  double  the  initial  forecast.  To  ascribe  this  doubling  of 
investment  in  equipment  with  respect  to  initial  forecasts  to  the  positive 
"news
11  concerning  European  integration  would  be  a  reasoning  of  the  type 
post  hoc,  ergo  propter  hoc.  The  provision  of  adequate  liquidity,  in  the 
wake  of  the  stockmarket  crash,  by  the  monetary  authorities and  the  enhanced 
efforts  in  the  field  of  international  economic  co-ordination  have 
undoubtedly  exerted  a  major  influence  in  downpl ayi ng  the  threats  of  a 
recession  as  contained  in  the  forecasts.  Nevertheless,  there  is  some 
evidence  which  suggests  that  "1992
11  may  have  had,  and  probably  is  still -3-
Table  1:  Deta11ed  aggregated  macroeconomic  simulation  results  of  the 
completion  of  the  internal  market  for  EUR12,  percentage 
differences  from  baseline,  unless  otherwise  indicated 
Year  1  Year  2  Year  3  Year  4  Year  5  Year  6 
Private  consumpt1on  0.6 
Government  consumption  0.9 
Gross  fixed  cap.  formation  2.3 
- Government  0.0 
- Residential  0.5 
- Firms  3.7 
Exports  of  goods  and  serv.  3.4 
Imports  of  goods  and  serv.  2.9 
Gross  domestic  product  1.1 
Private  consumption  -1.6 
Export  prices  -0.9 
Import  prices  -1.3 
Nominal  wage  rate  -1.0 
Real  wage  rate  0.8 
Terms  of  trade  0.5 
GOP  deflator  -1.7 
Employment1)  -533 
Employment  -0.4 
Unemployment1)  446 
Unemployment  rate2)  0.3 
Labour  productivity/head  1.6 
Utilization  rate  industry2)  0.9 
Budget  surplus3)  0.1 
Current  balance3)  0.3 
Gr.op.surplus3)  0.5 
Real  disp.income  households  0.9 
1)  Thousands 
1.3 
0.8 
3.7 
0.0 
1.8 
5.5 
5.5 
4.4 
2.3 
-2.7 
-2.0 
-2.1 
-2.2 
0.8 
0.1 
-2.9 
-40 
-0.0 
13 
0.0 
2.4 
1.7 
0.7 
0.4 
0.7 
1.4 
2)  Absolute  difference  in  percentage  points 
3)  Absolute  difference  in  per  cent  of  GOP 
1.9 
0.9 
4.4 
0.0 
3.2 
6.2 
7.4 
5.4 
3.2 
-3.7 
-3.3 
-3.2 
-2.9 
1. 1 
-0.2 
-4.0 
552 
0.5 
-396 
-0.3 
2.7 
2.1 
1.2 
0.6 
0.6 
2.0 
2.3 
1.0 
5.1 
0.0 
4.2 
6.8 
8.6 
6.1 
3.6 
-4.7 
-4.3 
-3.9 
-3.4 
1.5 
-0.4 
-5.0 
1043 
0.8 
-746 
-0.3 
2.8 
2.2 
1.6 
0.8 
0.2 
2.3 
2.7 
1.0 
5.4 
0.0 
4.6 
7.0 
9.6 
6.7 
4.1 
-5.5 
-5.0 
-4.5 
-3.8 
1. 9 
-0.5 
-5.9 
1462 
1.2 
-994 
-0.6 
3.0 
2.3 
1.9 
0.9 
-0.1 
2.7 
3.1 
1. 1 
5.4 
0.0 
4.7 
7.0 
10.5 
7.2 
4.5 
-6.7 
-5.6 
-5.0 
-4.0 
2.2 
-0.6 
-6.5 
1866 
1.5 
-1255 
-0.7 
3.0 
2.5 
2.2 
1.0 
-0.4 
2.9 
Source:  Catinat et al.,  1988.  Simulations  with  HERMES  and  INTERLINK  models 
having,  a  non-negligible  impact  on  business  expectations  and  a  fortiori  on 
investment.  The  business  survey  conc;jucted  for  the  study  into  the  cost  of 
non-Europe  showed  an  average  expected  increase  in  sales  of  5%  due  to  the 
completion  of  the  internal  market  (Commission  of  the  EC,  1988a),  indicating 
positive demand  expectations.  In  a more  recent  survey  by  the  Commission  of 
the  EC  (1989d)  concerning  the  effects  of  the  internal  market  in  the -4-
manufacturing  industry,  the  positive  expectations  about  the  evolution  of 
sales,  investment,  employment  and  productivity  are  largely  confirmed.  On 
the  whole,  it would  therefore  seem  justified  to  ascribe  at  least  part  of 
the  investment  boom  which  started  in  1988  to  factors  related  to  the 
acceleration  of  the  process  of  European  integration.  Incidentally,  it may 
be  noted  that  despite  annual  increases  in  labour  productivity  of  2%, 
employment  in  the  Community  is  forecast  to  increase  with  1.5  million  jobs 
more  over  the  period  1988-1990  than  it  did  over  the  period  1985-1987 
(Commission  of  the  EC,  1989c).  In  the  Cecchini  report  it was  estimated  that 
the  productivity  gains  of  the  internal  market  could  initially  lead  to 
emp 1  oyment  1  asses.  Insofar  as  the  present  productivity  increases  embody 
internal  market  effects,  their possible  negative  impact  on  employment  seems 
thus  to  be  absent  or  negligible. 
Aside  from  political  developments  and  economic  performance,  the  prospect  of 
the  internal  market  has  also  stirred economic  research.  The  purpose  of  the 
present  paper  is  to  provide  a  concise,  but  by  no  means  exhaustive  overview 
of  the  abundant  1 i terature  that  has  developed  over  the  past  18  months 
concerning  the  economic  implications  of  the  internal  market*).  Within  this 
literature,  two  strands  of  research  may  be  distinguished.  On  the  one  hand, 
research  devoted  to  the  analysis  and  conclusions  contained  in  the  Cecchini 
report.  This  1 i ne  of  research  is  the  subject  of  section  2.  On  the  other 
hand,  research  has  concentrated  on  the 
11White  sp.ots
11  in  the  Cecchini 
report,  subjects  which  due  to  lack  of  information  or  resources  were  not 
extensively  covered  by  the  research  into  the 
11Cost  of  non-Europe
11
•  Here, 
five  themes  may  be  distinguished.  The  first  concerns  the  regional  effects 
of  the  internal  market  with  the  Community,  and  is discussed  in  section  3. 
Secondly,  there  is  the  sectoral  impact  within  the  Community.  This  is  the 
subject  of  section  4.  Thirdly,  there  are  the  external  implications  of  the 
internal  market,  taken  up  in  section  5.  In  section  6  the  dynamic  effects 
are  analysed,  while  the  concluding  section  regards  the  role  of  accompanying 
policies. 
*)  This  excludes  a  discussion  of  the  evolving  literature  concerning  the 
progress  towards  Economic  and  Monetary  Union. !) 
-5-
2.  1992:  POTENTIALITY  OR  REALITY? 
There  appears  to  be  confusion  about  the  nature  of  the  quantitative gains  of 
the  completion  of  the  internal  market  as  estimated  in  the  Cecchini  report. 
In  terms  of  economic  implications,  three  situations  may  be  distinguished, 
representing  a  descending  order  of  magnitude  of  effects.  The  first 
situation  is  that  in  which  all  maximum  potential  effects  of  the  internal 
market  are  realised.  For  this  to  happen,  two  conditions  have  to  be  met.  In 
the  first  place,  all  the  White  Paper  measures  would  have  to  be  adopted  and 
effectively  implemented  into  national  law.  Secondly,  given  an  internal 
market  which  exists  on  paper  including  the  necessary  accompanying  policies 
(such  as  an  effective  competition  pol icy),  the  economic  structure  in  the 
integrated  market  would  be  that  which  is  theoretically  expected.  This 
would  correspond  to  an  integration  scenario  in  which  prices differ only  due 
to  transport  costs.  A second  situation  is  that  in  which  the  constrained 
potential  gains  of  the  intern~l  market  come  into  effect.  This  would  also 
require  the  effective  implementation  of  the  White  Paper,  but  would, 
concerning  the  degree  of  market  integration,  hinge  on  a  realistic estimate 
of  the  effects  of  increased  market  size  and  enhanced  competition.  This 
scenario  would  thus  not  necessarily  correspond  to  what  is  theoretically 
expected.  The  third  situation  is  that of  the  realised  gains.  These  are  the 
gains  as  corresponding  to  the  actual  degree  of  implementation  of  the  White 
Paper,  as  well  as  the  realised  increase  in  effective market  integration. 
The  estimates  contained  in  the  Cecchini  report  may  be  considered  to  vary 
between  those  corresponding  to  the  maximum  and  constrained  potential 
effects.  For  instance,  for  the  microeconomic  calculations,  different 
hypotheses  about  the  degree  of  market  integration  have  been  used  in  order 
to  obtain  a  range  of  effects  from  economies  of  scale  and  enhanced 
competition  (X-inefficiencies,  monopoly  rents).  Another  example  concerns 
the  effects  of  the  liberalisation  of  financial  services,  where  it  was 
assumed  that  only  about  50%  of  the  potential  price  decrease  (i.e. 
convergence  to  the  lowest  price  levels)  would  be  realised.  Consequently, 
. even  the  upperbound  of  the  range  estimated  for  the  welfare  effects  from  the 
microeconomic  calculations  probably  underestimates  the  maximum  possible -6-
effects  of  the  internal  market.  This  is  even  more  true  given  that  some 
possible  dynamic  effects  were  not  included  in  the  calculations  (e.g. 
effects  of  competition  on  innovation  and  technical  progress).  Similarly, 
the  macroeconomic  calculations  are  probably  closer  to  the  constrained 
rather than  the  maximum  potential  effects  (cf.  Commission  of  the  EC,  1988a, 
p.117  and  Catinat and  Italianer,  1988). 
A good  case  in  point  concerning  confusion  is  the  paper  by  Kay  (1989),  who 
states that 
"The  Commission's  estimates  of  the  costs of  'non-Europe'  tend,  for  obvious 
political reasons,  to err on  the high side,  and it is improbable  that  trade 
formalities will  be  eliminated  completely  or  a  free  market  in  road haulage 
achieved." 
This  statement  apparently  identifies  the  estimates  of  the  Cecchini  report 
with  the  .. rea 1 i sed  effects 
11  of  the  i nterna  1  market  described  above.  The 
awareness  of  the  Commission  of  the  difference  between 
11potent ia  1
11  and 
11 rea 1 is  tic..  outcome  is,  however,  exemp 1 i fi ed  by  the  fo 11 owing  statement 
(Commission  of  the  EC,  1988a,  p.155). 
"  a  possible  source  of  overestimation  is  the  policy hypothesis  about 
'completing'  the  internal  market.  This  may  turn  out  stronger  than  the 
actual  outcome...  it  is  not  for  the  present  study  to  offer alternative 
scenarios  on  this  point.  On  the  contrary,  the  study  aims  to  supply 
information  on  the potential gains. " 
Thus,  if  Kay  states  (p.9)  that  a  realistic assessment  of  the  cost  savings 
obtainable  from  reductions  in  distribution  costs  would  be  half  the  level 
estimated  in  the  Cecchini  report,  this  should  not  be  interpreted  as  an 
alternative  view  on  the  potential  gains,  but  rather  as  an  estimate  of  the 
actual  outcome  as  referred  to  above.  Moreover,  this view  itself does  not 
seem  to  be  corroborated  by  the  number  of  White  paper  measures  adopted  by 
the  Council  halfway  through  1989. -7-
The  Dutch  Central  Planning  Bureau  (1989),  on  the  other  hand,  which  made 
its  own  calculations  on  macroeconomic  effects  of  the  internal  market  at 
Community  level  as  a  reference  case  for  its simulation  for  the  Netherlands, 
clearly makes  a  distinction  between  the  potential  effects  contained  iri  the 
Cecchini  report  and  its  own  hypotheses  geared  to  obtaining  a  realistic 
estimate  of  the  actual  effects.  In  order  to  obtain  the  latter,  several  of 
the  model  shocks  given  for  the  Cecchini  simulations  were  scaled  down,  thus 
reducing  the  macroeconomic  consequences  accordingly.  In  addition  they 
contain  an  interesting  new  element  with  respect  to  the  Cecchini  simulations 
in  the  form  of  an  assumption  about  increased  inward  investment  in  the 
Community  (cf.  Bakhoven,  1989).  Although  these  calculations  have  the  merit 
of  spelling out  clearly where  they  depart  from  the  Commission's  hypotheses, 
they  do  not  seem  to  add  new  information  s i nee  they  1  ack  the  empi rica  1 
content  on  which  the  latter were  based,  even  for  the  shock  given  to  inward 
investment.  Stated  bluntly:  if  the  inputs  are  halved,  the  results  are 
halved,  but  what  does  this  tell  if  the  inputs  are  halved  due  to  other 
11expectations
11? 
A second  confusion  about  the  potential  benefits  of  the  internal  market  has 
to  do  with  the  nature  and  the  composition  of  the  effects  giving  rise  to 
them.  The  Cecchini  report  makes  a  distinction  between  the  direct  cost  of 
barriers  and  the  (indirect)  market  integration  effects.  The  former  may  be 
decomposed  further  into  the  cost  of  barriers affecting  trade  such  as  delays 
at  the  border  or  cost  related  to  administrative  formalities  and  the  cost 
deriving  from  barriers  to  market  access  such  as  restrictive  public 
procurement  practices  or  prudential  regulations  concerning  financial 
services. 
Market  integration  effects  are  those  arising  from  the  increase  in  market 
size and  enhanced  competition.  In  principle,  increases  in  market  size allow 
for  economies  of  scale  or  economies  of  scope,  while  enhanced  competition 
may  be  expected  to  put  pressure  on  the  efficiency  of  firms  previously 
operating  in  a  protected  national  segment  of  the  Community-wide  market, 
together  with  a  decrease  in  the  monopoly  rents  they  could  enjoy  in  that 
situation. -8-
Table  2:  Origin  of  welfare  gains,  microeconomic  analysis,  percentage  of 
tot  a 1  gains 
Variant1 
A-I  A-II  B-1  B-11 
Direct  cost  of  barriers 
1.  Barriers  affecting  trade  5  6  5  6 
2.  Barriers  affecting  all  production  33  45  38  50 
Market  integration  effects 
3.  Economies  of  scale  35  13  33  11 
4.  Competitions  effects  on  X-inefficiency  and  27  36  25  32 
monopoly  rents 
Total2  100  100  100  100 
PM:  Welfare  effect,  % of  GOP  5,8  4,3  6,4  4,8 
1  Variants  A  and  B  correspond  to  the  minimum  and  maximum  of  the  range  of 
direct  cost  effects.  Variants  I  and  II  correspond  to  two  alternative 
calculations  for  the  market  integration  effects 
2  Figures  may  not  add  due  to  rounding 
Source:  Calculated  from  Commission  of  the  EC,  1988a,  pp.  154-156 
As  Table  2 shows,  and  depending  on  the  scenario which  is adopted,  economies 
of  scale  contribute  for  one-tenth  to  one-third  to  the  total  welfare  gains 
as  calculated  in  the  microeconomic  analysis  of  the  Cecchini  report.  Taken 
together,  the  most  important  effects  (60-80%)  arise,  however,  from  the 
elimination  of  restrictions  to  market  entry and  the  ef,iects  from  enhanced 
competition.  In  the  Cecchini  report it is  recognized  that possibilities for 
economies  of  sea  1  e  are  not  present  in  every  sector  of  industry:  it  is 
estimated  that  one-third  of  industry  would  be  capable  of  moving  closer 
towards  the  minimum  efficient  technical  scale  (cf.  Commission  of  the  EC, 
1988a,  p.154).  Thus,  if Geroski  (1989,  p.33)  writes 
"The  view  of  the  Co11UI1iss ion  appears  to  be  that  economies  of  scale  are 
present  and  unexploited  in  most  sectors"  . . .  (and)  "that  the  potential 
gains  of  restructuring  are  so  large  that  only  a  fraction  of  the  total 
benefits that  are  expected  to  flow  from  1992 will  be  directly  associated 
with removing  barriers. " -9-
there  is  apparently  confusion  about  the  size  of  the  contribution  of 
economies  of  sea 1  e  to  the  tota  1  we 1  fare  gains  re 1  at  i ve  to  that  of  the 
abolition  of  market  entry  restrictions  (which  are  directly  linked  to 
removing  barriers). 
3.  REGIONAL  EFFECTS  WITHIN  THE  COMMUNITY 
The  macroeconomic  effects  for  the  Community  in  its entirety as  calculated 
for  the  Cecchini  report  were  the  result  of  a  linear  extrapolation  of  the 
outcomes  obtained  with  linked  macrosectoral  or  macroeconomic  models  for  a 
1  imited  number  of  countries.  In  the  four  simulations  which  were  executed 
(customs  barriers,  public  procurement,  financial  services and  the  so-called 
11Supply  effects
11
),  only  results  for  Germany,  France,  Italy and  the  United 
Kingdom  were  present  in  all  four  cases  (cf.  Catinat  et al.,  1988).  Belgium 
was  represented  in  three  of  the  four  cases  (no  inputs  were  available  for 
11supply  effects
11
),  the  Netherlands  in  two  out  of  four  (customs  barriers and 
financial  services),  while  results  for  Spain  were  only  available  for  the 
simulation  concerning  financial  services.  Moreover,  for  the 
11Supply-shocks",  which  accounted  for  an  important  share  of  the  medium-term 
effects  on  GOP,  the  inputs  for  the  effects  of  economies  of  sea 1  e  and 
competition  were  the  same  for  all  four  countries.  Consequently  less 
significance  could  be  attributed  to  the  individual  country  results  than  to 
the  Community  result  which  was  derived  from  it.  In  any  case,  the 
differences  between  the  aggregate  results  for  the  four  big  countries  were 
not  sufficiently large  to  be  significant  (see  Table  3). 
Given  that  for  Belgium  three  of  the  four  simulations  are  available  and 
given  the  procedure  followed  for  the  "supply  effects",  the  average  of  the 
results  of  the  "supply  effects"  for  the  four  big  countries  could  be  added 
to  the  other  results  in  order  to  obtain  an  estimate  for  the  total  effects 
of  the  completion  of  the  internal  market  for  Belgium.  This  is  the 
procedure  which  was  followed  by  the  Belgian  Bureau  du  Plan  (cf.  Van 
Sebroeck,  1988)  and  Italianer and  Vanheukelen  (1989),  and  the  results  have -10-
been  included  in  Table  3  since  they  are  comparable  to  the  results  for 
Germany,  France,  Italy  and  the  United  Kingdom.  Compared  to  the  Community 
average,  two  differences  stand  out  for  Belgium:  the  medium-term  effect  on 
employment  and  the  effect  on  the  balance  on  current  account.  The  latter 
seems  to  be  due  to  its  relative  openness  within  the  Community  (exports  of 
goods  and  services  represented  69%  of  the  value  of  GOP  in  1988),  combined 
with  an  intra-EC  trade  share  of  almost  75%.  This  is  probably  also  the 
reason  why  despite  a  lower  increase  in  labour  productivity  the  same 
increase  in  GOP  as  for  the  Community  average  is  attained,  together 
resulting  in  a  stronger effect on  employment. 
Table  3:  Comparison  of  medium-term 
11potentia1
11  macroeconomic  effects  of 
the  completion  of  the  internal  market 
B  0  F  UK  EC 
Percentage  differences 
Gross  domestic  product  4.5  4.2  5.1  5.5  4.0  4.5 
Deflator  private  consumption  -5.1  -6.2  -4.9  -7.1  -7.4  -6.2 
Deflator  GOP  -5.0  -5.2  -5.6  -8.3  -8.1  -6.5 
Real  wages  2.2  3.1  1.5  1.2  2.7  2.2 
Labour  productivity  2. 1  2.5  3.5  3.9  2.9  3.0 
Employment  2.0  1.7  1.6  1.4  1.4  1.5 
Absolute  differences 
Employment  (
1000)  73  438  342  308  385  1866 
Budget  surplus  (%  GOP)  3.0  1.5  2.6  3.7  1.8  2.2 
Current  balance  (%  GOP)  2.4  0.7  1.4  1.0  0.6  1.0 
Source:  Catinat  et  a 1 .  (1988),  Italianer  and  Vanheukelen  (1989),  Van 
Sebroeck  (1988) 
The  calculations  made  by  the  Dutch  Central  Planning  Bureau  (1989) 
concerning  the  macroeconomic  consequences  of  the  completion  of  the  internal 
market  for  the  Netherlands  cannot  be  compared  to  those  of  Table  3  due  to 
the  fact  that  it  concerns  so-called 
11real istic
11  estimates,  based  on  the 
CPB•s 
11expected
11  outcome  of  the  internal  market  completion,  rather  than 
11potential
11  estimates,  as  discussed  in  the  previous  section.  Table  4 
therefore  compares  the  .. realistic" estimates  of  the  CPB  for  the  Netherlands -II-
to  its  own  "realistic"  estimates  for  the  average  effect  on  the  EC.  The 
somewhat  better performance  for  the  Netherlands  compared  to  the  average  for 
the  Comnunity  is  attributed  by  the  CPB  to  the  relative  openness  of  the 
Dutch  economy.  This  result  is  therefore  in  accordance  with  that  for 
Belgium.  Furthermore  it is noteworthy  that the  CPB  simulations  for  both  the 
Netherlands  and  the  EC  imply  real  wage  increases  which  exhaust  completely 
the  increase  in  labour  productivity.  It  is  stressed  by  the  CPB  (e.g.  p.6) 
that  if  this  would  only  be  partially  the  case  (as  in  Table  3,  for 
instance),  employment  would  probably  benefit more  than  it does  according  to 
the  present  calculations. 
The  Cecchini  report  seldom  includes  results  for  the  peripheral  countries  of 
the  Comnunity  (Denmark,  Greece,  Spain,  Ireland,  Portugal).  Only  the  results 
of  the  business  survey  are  available  for  all  member  countries.  These 
results  indicate  expected  increases  in  sales  of  7.3%  in  the  five 
peripheral  countries  compared  to  4.7%  in  the  other  member  countries 
(Comnission  of  the  EC,  1988a,  p.152).  On  this  basis,  the  European 
Commission  estimates  that the  gains  of  the  internal  market  as  calculated  on 
the  basis  of  an  extrapolation  of  the  results  for  mainly  the  latter 
countries  could  well  be  underestimated.  So  far,  relatively little evidence 
is  available  in  this  respect.  Results  for  Ireland  have  been  published  by 
o•sullivan  (1989).  His  results  have  an  interesting dimension  because,  while 
starting  from  inputs  comparable  to  those  of  the  Cecchini  report,  this 
author  has  been  trying  to  introduce  an  explicit timing  for  the  introduction 
of  the  shocks.  In  doing  so,  the  medium-term  effects  from  the  Cecchini 
report  have,  in  most  cases,  been  assumed  to  occur  over  a  seven-year  period, 
and  have  been  introduced  in  equal  amounts  over  such  a  period  starting  in 
years  varying  between  1990  and  1993,  as  a  rule  in  1991  or  in  1992.  Given 
that the  Irish  simulation  results  have  not  been  published  for  years  beyond 
1994,  the  figures  for  this year  cannot  be  considered  to  be  the  medium-term 
effects  for  Ireland.  This  is  partly  because  the  medium-term  effects  have 
not  had  time  to  work  themselves  fully  out,  and  partly  because  the  shocks 
have  not  been  introduced  completely.  The  effects  for  1994  are  therefore  to 
be  considered  as  lying  somewhere  between  the  initial  and  third-year effects 
of  the  Cecchini  report,  which  started from  the  hypothesis  that the  internal 
market  was  completed  at  the  start  of  the  simulations.  This  conclusion  is - 12-
Table  4:  Comparison  of  medium  term 
11realistic
11  macroeconomic  effects  of 
the  completion  of  the  internal  market 
Netherlands  EC 
Percentage  differences 
Gross  domestic  product  3.25  2.25 
Deflator  private  consumption  -2  -1.75 
Deflator  GOP  -2 
Real  wages  3.50  2.50 
Labour  productivity  3.25  2.25 
Employment  0  0 
Absolute  differences 
Employment  ('000)  0  0 
Budget  surplus  (%  GOP)  0  0 
Current  balance  (%GOP)  0.25  0 
Source:  Central  Planning  Bureau  (1989)  and  own  calculations.  Both  columns 
include  the  effects  of  full  use  of  room·  for  budgetary  manoeuvre 
(tax  decrease),  even  although  the  latter  is  small  (e.g.  0.3%  of 
GNP  for  the  EC,  cf.  Bakhoven,  1989) 
Table  5:  Macroeconomic  effects  of  the  completion  of  the  internal  market  for 
Ireland  in  1994  compared  to  initial  average  EC  effects  from  the 
Cecchini  report. 
Ireland  EC 
1994  Year  1 
Percentage  differences 
Gross  domestic  product  1.8  1. 1 
Deflator  private  consumption  -1.1  -1.6 
Real  wages  0.3  0.8 
Labour  productivity  1.2  1.6 
Employment  0.7  -0.4 
Absolute  differences 
Budget  surplus  (%  GOP)*  0.5  0.1 
Current  balance  (%  GOP)*  -0.3  0.3 
*  %GNP  for  Ireland 
Source:  O'Sullivan  (1989)  and  own  calculations  for 
(1988)  for  EC.  Results  for  Ireland  include 
harmonisation  (+0.1%  of  GOP  in  1994). 
Year  2  Year  3 
2.3  3.2 
-2.7  -3.7 
0.8  1. 1 
2.4  2.7 
-0.0  0.5 
0.7  1.2 
0.4  0.6 
Ireland.  Catinat  et  a 1 • 
effects  of  indirect  tax (3) 
-13-
illustrated  by  Table  5,  which  compares  the  1994  results  for  Ireland  to 
those  for  the  first  three years  for  the  EC  as  calculated  for  the  Cecchini 
report.  The  only  variable whose  behaviour  diverges  in  a  negative  sense  from 
that for  the  EC  average  is the  current balance,  which  turns  negative. 
According  to  O'Sullivan  (1989,  p.61)  this  is  due  to  a  temporary  surge  in 
imports  to  meet  the  expansion  of  industrial  investment.  Another  remarkable 
result  is  the  slow  evolution  of  real  wages  with  respect  to  that of  labour 
productivity  and  the  ensuing  positive  consequences  for  employment.  It  is 
difficult  to  conclude  on  the  basis  of  Table  5  that  a  peripheral  country 
such  as  Ireland  would  indeed  profit  more  from  the  completion  of  the 
internal  market  than  the  Member  States  in  the  centre.  What  seems  to  stand 
out,  however,  is that the  Irish economy  should  not  lose  from  the  process  of 
integration  (as  is  sometimes  asserted  for  the  peripheral  economies),  and 
that, as  in  the  case  of  the  Netherlands,  assumptions  about  the  behaviour  of 
real  wages  in  relation  to  the  productivity gains  are  crucial  for  the  final 
effects on  employment. 
The  importance  of  assumptions  about  wage  behaviour  is also  stressed  by  the 
Danish  Economic  Council  (Det  ~konomiske Rad,  1989).  On  the  basis of  its own 
11realistic
11  assumptions  about  the_  effects  of  the  internal  market  for 
Denmark,  three  variants are  presented  each  with  different assumptions  about 
the  likely  evolution  of  nominal  wages  (see  Table  6).  The  scenario  with 
unchanged  nominal  wages  is  equal  to  the  scenario  with  the  base  case 
11realistic
11  estimate.  This  scenario  uses  the  Cecchini  hypotheses  for  the 
direct  cost  barriers,  but  excludes,  for  no  stated  reason,  those  for 
economies  of  scale or  other market  integration effects. This  scenario  being 
partially based  on  a  factor  productivity  shock  of  2.4%,  the  latter may  be 
seen  to  be  almost  completely  exhausted  by  the  real  wage  increase  of  1.9%. 
Scenarios  B and  C,  with  real  wage  increases  in  Denmark  of  1.5%  and  1.0% 
respectively,  show  the  crucial  role  of  real  wage  moderation  in  influencing 
unemployment  and  components  of  GOP  other  than  private consumption.* 
* As  may  be  seen  in  Table  3,  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  real 
wage  moderation  and  employment  creation  is  not  unique:  it depends,  inter 
alia,  on  the  size of  the  Phillips curve  effect. -14-
Table  6:  The  effects  of  different  wage  assumptions  on  a  "realistic" 
estimate  of  consequences  of  internal  market  for  Denmark, 
percentage  difference  from  baseline  unless  otherwise  stated. 
A.  Unchanged  nominal  wage 
Gross  domestic  productl 
Private  consumption 
Deflator  private  consumption 
Current  balance  (%  GOP) 
Unemployment  (•ooo) 
B.  1%  nominal  wage  decrease, 
Gross  domestic  productl 
Private  consumption 
Deflator private  consumption 
Current  balance  (%GOP) 
Unemployment  ( 1000) 
C.  2%  nominal  wage  decrease 
Gross  domestic  productl 
Private  consumption 
Deflator private  consumption 
Current  balance  (%  GOP) 
Unemployment  ( 1000) 
1  At  factor  cost 
Year  0 
0.2 
0.2 
-1.1 
-0.3 
22 
Average 
Years  1-5 
0.8 
1.2 
-1.9 
-0.5 
16 
EC  including  Denmark 
0.2 
0.0 
-1.4 
-0.3 
21 
1. 1 
1.0 
-2.5 
-0.5 
11 
in  Denmark;  1%  in  rest of  EC 
0.3  1.5 
-0.2  0.8 
-1.7  -3.1 
-0.2  -0.2 
19  2 
Source:  Det  pkonom1ske  R~d,  1989,  p.89. 
Average 
Years  6-10 
1.2 
1.7 
-1.9 
-0.5 
10 
1. 5 
1.5 
-2.5 
-0.4 
4 
1.9 
1.3 
-3.0 
0.0 
-6 -15-
4.  THE  SECTORAL  IMPACT 
Although  it  has  been  demonstrated  in  the  previous  sections  that  the 
i nterna 1  market  programme  bears  consequences  of  macroeconomic  magnitude, 
its chief  influences  as  a deregulatory  programme  will  be  felt at a  sectoral 
level.  Given  differing  degrees  of  deregulation  and  1 iberal isation  at  the 
outset,  sectors  wi 11  be  affected  and  transformed  as  a  consequence  of  the 
internal  market  in  many  different ways  and  in  varying  degrees. 
Three  different  approaches  seem  to  have  been  followed  in  order  to  analyse 
the  sectora  1  impact  of  the  i nterna 1  market.  The  first  approach  is  the 
horizontal  one:  for  one  particular  sector  (e.g.  telecommunications)  or 
subject matter  (e.g.  economies  of  scale),  the  implications  for  one  or  more 
member  countries  are  analysed.  Secondly,  there  is  the  vertical  approach: 
for  one  particular country  or  region,  the  effects  on  all  sectors  are  being 
investigated.  Finally,  a  matrix  methodology  may  be  used  in  which  several 
sectors and  countries  are  scrutinized simultaneously  on  a  comparable  basis. 
The  horizontal  approach  was  the  one  followed  in  most  contributions  to  the 
research  into  the  "cost  of  non-Europe"  (cf.  the  list  of  reports  in 
Commission  of  the  EC,  1998a),  and  it  has  s i nee  then  been  used  for  other 
studies as  well,  e.g.  in  financial  services  (cf.  Van  den  Bempt  and  Quintyn 
(eds),  1989)  or  the  welfare  effects  of  restructuring  with  imperfect 
competition  and  economies  of  scale  in  Portugal  and  Spain  (cf.  Corado  and 
Leite,  1989).  This  approach  has  the  advantage  that  it can  take  account  of 
the  individual  characteristics  of  a  particular  sector  and  can  thus  adapt 
its methodology  accordingly.  While  this allows  to  present  results  that fit 
the  need  of  a  single  sector  or  problem  area,  it does  not  permit  in  general 
to  draw  conclusions  that  may  be  compared  among  sectors.  From  the  point  of 
view  of  economic  policy  this  may  be  suboptimal,  for  instance  in  the  case 
where  a  particular  sector  is  weak  relative  to  its  foreign  competitors  but 
at  the  same  time  strong  compared  to  other  sectors  in  the  same  country  and 
should  therefore  be  stimulated. - 16-
Obviously,  this  problem  is  not  resolved  through  the  use  of  the  vertical 
approach,  which  simply  turns  the  question  around  by  90  degrees.  In  the  case 
of  the  vertical  approach,  a  common  denominator  has  to  be  found  by  which  the 
effects of  the  internal  market  may  be  compared  intersectorally.  One  example 
of  this  approach  are  the  sectoral  results  for  output  and  employment  in  the 
Netherlands  as  simulated  by  the  Central  Planning  Bureau  (1989).  As  Table  7 
shows,  the  1  iberal isation  of  transport  and  financial  services  implied  by 
the  White  Paper  would  have  particularly  positive  effects  on  production  in 
the  corresponding  sectors within  the  Netherlands,  but  would  imply  negative 
effects  on  employment  in  these  sectors,  which  is  important  information  for 
a  policymaker.  Nevertheless,  this  information  does  not  tell  anything  about 
the  evolution  in  similar  sectors  abroad,  and  therefore  lacks  the 
international  dimension. 
The  macroeconomic  and  mi croeconomi c  approaches  applied  for  the  Cecchini 
report  are  examples  of  matrix  approaches.  The  sectoral  models  used  for  the 
macroeconomic  simulations  were  of  a  relatively  aggregate  nature 
(9  sectors)  and  moreover  they  were  not  used  for  a  11  countries  and  a  11 
simulation  exercises.  This  would  therefore  provide  an  intercountry/inter-
sectoral  picture  which  would  be  too  incomplete  and  of  a  too  aggregate 
nature  in  order  to  draw  sensible  conclusions  at  detailed  sectoral  level. 
The  microeconomic  approach  offers more  hold  in  this  respect.  Table  8 shows, 
in  column  1,  the  EUR  7  welfare  gains  for  37  sectors  as  published  in  the 
Cecchini  report  (average  of  minimum  and  maximum)  expressed  as  a  percentage 
of  final  production  (value  added).  The  sectors  most  affected  in  terms  of 
welfare  gains  are  those  for  intermediate  goods  and  equipment  goods,  with 
welfare  gains  ranging  from  12%  to  more  than  20%  (except  for  basic  metal 
products:  7.4%). 
For  consumer  products  the  gains  are  somewhat  1  ess  on  average,  varying 
between  4%  and  14%.  In  the  service  sectors,  the  biggest welfare  gains  (12%) 
come  from  the  financial  services  sector,  for  most  other  sectors  the  gains 
do  not  exceed  the  Community  average  of  5. 2%.  These  resu 1  ts  show  the 
enormous  potential  impacts  at sectoral  level  which  are  not  displayed  in  the 
macroeconomic  aggregate  due  to  the  relatively  high  shares  of  the  sectors 
for  building,  wholesale  and  retail  trade,  lodging  and  catering,  renting  and (4) 
-17-
non-market  services  (together  representing  52%  of  final  production)  which 
are  hardly  affected. 
Table  7:  Indicator1  for  sectoral  production  and  employment  effects  in  the 
Netherlands  due  to  EC'92 
Agriculture 
Food,  beverages  and  tobacco 
Textiles  and  clothing 
Chemicals 
Metals 
Other  manufactures 
Mining  and  quarrying 
Oil  refinery  and  public  utilities 
Construction 
Commerce 
Traffic  and  transportation 
Other  tertiary  services 
Total  for  all  enterprises 
Production  volume  Employment 
(+)  0 
+  + 
++  + 
++  + 
++  + 
+  + 
(+)  0 
+  0 
(+)  + 
++  + 
+++ 
++ 
+  0 
1  On  the  basis  of  the  cumulative  effect after  six  years.  The  output  effects 
are  all  positive.  A  +  sign  indicates  an  effect  of  the  same  order  of 
magnitude  as  for  total  enterprises.  A  (+)  sign  indicates  a  relatively 
small  effect,  etc.  The  employment  effects  are  zero  for  total 
enterprises.  Sectoral  deviations  are  self-explanatory. 
Source:  Central  Planning  Bureau  (1989) -18-
Table  8:  Comparison  of  welfare  gains  and  sensitive  sectors,  EUR7 
NACE-CLIO  NACE 
(R44)  Groups 
Branches 
01 
03 
05 
07 
09 
11 
13 
15 
17 
19 
21 
247 
248 
251 
256 
257 
315 
321 
322 
323 
324 
325 
326 
Description  Welfare  Sensit.  Share  in 
Goods 
Agricultural,  forestry  and 
fishery  products 
Coal,  lignite  (brown  coal) 
and  briquettes 
Products  of  coking 
Crude  petroleum,  natural  gas 
and  petroleum  products 
Electric  power,  gas,  steam 
and  water 
Production  and  processing  of 
radioactive  materials  and  ores 
gains 
" 
6.9 
2.6 
0 
3.5 
6.5 
0 
Ferrous  and  non-ferrous  ores  and  15.8 
metals,  other  than  radioactive 
Non-metallic  mineral  products  12.4 
-Glass  (plate,  hollow, 
technical,  fibre  glass) 
-Ceramic  products 
Chemical  products  17.5 
-Basic  chemical  products 
-Other  chemical  products,  mainly 
for  industrial  and  agricultural 
purposes 
-Pharmaceutical  products 
Metal  products  except  machinery  7.4 
and  transport  equipment 
-Products  of  boilermaking 
Agricultural  and  industrial  12.3 
machinery 
-Agricult.machinery  and  tractors 
-Machine  tools  for  metal  working 
tools  and  equipm.for  machinery 
-Textile  mach.  and  accessories, 
sewing  machines 
-Machinery  for  the  food  and 
chemical  industries:  bottling, 
packaging,  wrapping  and  related 
machinery,  rubber  artificial 
plastics  working  machinery 
-Mining  equipment,  machinery  and 
equipment  for  metallurgy,  for 
preparation  of  build.materials, 
for  building  and  construction, 
for  mechan.handling  and  lifting 
-Gears  and  other  transmission 
equipment 
sectors  •as  final 
product. 
4 
4 
4 
4 
2 
2 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
1.20 
0.13 
0.03 
2.33 
1.87 
0.06 
0.54 
0.49 
2.33 
1.63 
3.45 NACE-CLIO  NACE 
(R44)  Groups 
Branches 
23 
25 
27 
29 
31 
33 
35 
327 
330 
372 
341 
342 
344 
345 
346 
347 
351 
361 
362 
364 
417 
421 
- 19-
Description  Welfare  Sensit.  Share  in 
gains  sectors  •as  final 
~  product. 
-Machinery  for  working  wood, 
paper,  leather  and  footwear 
laundering  and  dry-cleaning 
equipment 
Office  and  data  processing  21.4 
machines:  precision  and  optical 
instruments 
-Office  and  data  process.mach. 
-Medico-surgical  equipment, 
orthopaedic  appliances 
Electrical  goods  20.8 
-Insulated wires  and  cables 
~Electrical  motors,  generators, 
transformers,  switches,  etc. 
-Telecommunic.equipment,  meters 
and  measuring  equipment, 
electro-medical  equipment 
-Electronic  equipm.,  radio  and 
television  receiving  sets,sound 
reproducing  and  recording 
equipm.,  gramophone  records  and 
prerecorded  tapes 
-Electric  household  appliances 
-Electric  lamps  and  other  forms 
of  electric  lighting 
Motor  vehicles  14.9 
-Motor  vehicles  and  engines 
Other  transport  equipment  18.9 
-Boats,  steamers,  warships,  tugs 
floating  platforms  and  rigs, 
materials  from  the  breaking  up 
of  boats 
-Locomotives,  other  railway  and 
tramway  rolling-stock,  vans  and 
wagons 
-Aircraft,  helicopters,  hover-
craft,  missilies,space  vehicles 
and  other  aeronautical  equipm. 
Meats,  meat  preparations  and 
preserves,  other  products  from 
slaughtered  animals 
Milk  and  dairy  products 
Other  food  products 
-Food  pastes 
-Cocoa,  chocolate,  sweets,  ice-
creams 
5.0 
6.3 
6.3 
4 
1 
1 
3 
3 
1 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
2 
4 
3 
3 
1.06 
2.84 
3.58 
0.87 
1.30 
1.47 
3.00 NACE-CLIO  NACE 
(R44)  Groups 
Branches 
37 
39 
41 
43 
45 
47 
49 
51 
53 
425 
427 
428 
431 
432 
438 
453 
455 
451 
481 
491 
493 
494 
-20-
Description 
Beverages 
-Champagne,  sparkling  wines, 
wine-based  aperitifs 
-Malt,  beers,  brewers•  yeast 
-Mineral  waters,  soft  drinks 
Tobacco  products 
Textiles  and  clothing 
-Wool  industry 
-Cotton  industry 
-Carpets,  carpeting,  oilcloth, 
linoleum  and  other  coated 
fabrics 
-Ready-made  clothing 
-Household  linen,  bedding, 
curtains,  wall  coverings  and 
awnings,  sails,  flags,  bags 
Leathers,leather  and  skin  goods, 
footwear 
-Ready-made  footwear 
Timber,  wooden  products  and 
furniture 
Paper  and  printing  products 
Rubber  and  plastic  products 
-Rubber  products 
Other  manufacturing  products 
-Precious  and  costume  jewellery, 
goldsmiths•  and  silversmiths• 
products;  working  of  precious 
and  semi-precious  stones; 
diamond  cutting  and  polishing; 
striking  of  coins  and  medals 
-Products  for  printing  and 
developing  cinematographic  and 
photographic  films 
-Games,  toys,  sports  goods 
Building  and  construction 
Welfare  Sensit.  Share  in 
gains  sectors  •as  final 
%  product. 
5.9 
4.4 
4.3 
6.9 
4.7 
13.7 
12.9 
10.5 
2.2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
0.93 
1.14 
2.53 
0.63 
1.07 
0.94 
0.45 
0.46 
8.74 -21-
NACE-CLIO  NACE  Description  Welfare  Sensit.  Share  in 
(R44)  Groups  gains  sectors  •as  final 
Branches  ~  product. 
Market  services 
57  Wholesale  and  retail  trade  1.3  11.44 
59  Lodging  and  catering  services  1.8  3.46 
61  Inland  transport  services  4.9  1.15 
63  Maritime  and  air transport  serv.  4.5  1.15 
65  Auxiliary  transport  services  2.4  0.21 
67  Communication  services  6.1  0.96 
69  Services  of  credit  and  insurance  12.3  3.03 
institutions 
55+71+75+  Other  market  services  4.0  5.19 
77+79 
73  Services  of  renting  of  immovable  0.8  7.37 
goods 
81+85+89  Non-market  services  1. 1  20.98 
+93 
Total  5.2  100 
Source:  Column  1  calculated  from  Commission  of  the  EC  (1988a),  Table  A.3, 
average  of  columns  x  and  xi,  expressed  as  a  share  of  final 
production  from  Cawley  and  Davenport  (1988,  Table  A.1),  which  is 
also  the  source  for  column  3.  Column  2  from  Buigues  and  Ilzkovitz 
(1988a),  explanation  of  categories:  see  text -22-
The  size  of  welfare  gains  provides  a  general  indication  of  whether  a 
particular  sector will  see  changes  due  to  the  internal  market  and  if  so, 
whether  they  are  relatively  large.  For  an  individual  sector,  however,  this 
approach  offers  little  more  than  the  knowledge  that  "something  will 
happen
11
•  A very  useful  complement  to  this  method  is  therefore  provided  by 
the  method  applied  by  Buigues  and  Ilzkovitz  (1988a).  On  the  basis  of  a 
number  of  characteristics  such  as  importance  of  non-tariff barriers,  price 
dispersion  among  countries,  possibility  for  economies  of  scale,  degree  of 
concentration,  demand  growth  and  degree  of  openness  to  intra-EC  trade, 
these  authors  provide,  through  a  two-way  classification,  four  different 
categories  of  sectors  1 ikely  to  be  affected  by  the  internal  market.  All 
these  sectors  are  characterised  by  a  high  1  evel  of  non-tariff  barriers 
through  public  procurement  practices  or  different  technical  regulations. 
Based  on  detailed  sector  data  (NACE  3  digit)  for  the  non-peripheral 
Community  countries  (EUR7),  their analysis  provides  a  representative  X-ray 
for  each  Community  sector concerning  its weak  and  strong  points.  Group  1 is 
characterised  by  a  relatively high  intra-EC  import  penetration  ratio,  and  a 
low  level  of  price  dispersion.  These  are  the  high-tech  sectors  associated 
with  the  liberalisation of  public  procurement  (automation,  telecom,  medical 
equipment).  Group  2  has  a  low  level  of  intra-EC  import  penetration  and  a 
high  level  of  price  dispersion,  and  concerns  more  traditional  industries 
protected  as  being  "national  champions"  (boilers,  railway, 
pharmaceuticals).  The  sectors  of  group  3 also  have  a  low  degree  of  import 
penetration  but  a  low  level  of  price  dispersion,  and  concern  typically 
sectors  undergoing  major  restructuring  (shipbuilding,  electrical  and 
electronical  equipment,  certain  food-processing  industries).  The  largest 
group  is  group  4  with  very  strong  import  penetration  but  a  rather  high 
price  dispersion  due  to  existing  technical  and  administrative  barriers. 
These  sectors  (many  of  them  consumer  goods)  wi 11  primarily  be  affected 
downstream  (distribution networks)  through  intensified competition.  Table  8 
provides  the  lists of  sensitive  sectors  with  the  categories  to  which  they 
be 1  ong.  It may  be  seen  that  with  the  exception  of  text  i 1  es  the  sensitive 
sectors  all  fall  into  NACE-CLIO  R44  branches  with  higher-than-average 
welfare  gains.  Although  for  entirely  different  reasons,  the  sectors  of 
groups  1 and  3 all  belong  to  branches  with  welfare  gains  around  20%. -23-
On  the  basis  of  similar  and  additional  characteristics,  characterisations 
of  the  positions  of  national  sectors  could  be  obtained.  This  was  already 
done  for  Belgium  (cf.  Buigues  and  Ilzkovitz,  1988b),  and  will  be  published 
for  other Community  countries  in  the  near  future. -24-
5.  EXTERNAL  IMPLICATIONS 
Viewed  from  the  outside,  the  completion  of  the  internal  market  may  have 
negative  consequences  if it would  be  accompanied  by  trade diversion.  In  the 
classical  theory  of  economic  integration,  trade  diversion  occurs  if, 
through  the  formation  of a  customs  union,  the  common  external  tariff of  the 
countries  forming  the  union  implies  that  products  which  were  imported  from 
outside  the  union  under  the  previous  tariff  are  imported  from  inside  the 
union  afterwards.  In  empirical  analyses  of  the  effects  of  economic 
integration,  trade  diversion  is  usually  assumed  to  occur  if  the  value  of 
imports  from  outside  the  customs  union  decreases  after the  formation  of  the 
union  (cf.  Pelkmans,  1984).  The  internal  market  programme  does  not  deal 
with  tariff barriers,  but  rather with  the  breakdown  of  non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs)  inside  the  Community.  Conceptually  this  is  not  very  much  different 
from  the  classical  integration  case,  however,  and  it  is  therefore  no 
surprise  that  the  partial  equilibrium  calculations  for  the  direct  cost  of 
barriers  (which  run  along  the  lines  of  classical  integration  theory)  show 
decreases  in  extra-Community  imports  of  2 - 2.5%  for  stage  1 of  the  direct 
cost  calculations  (barriers  affecting  trade)  and  5.5  - 7.5%  for  stage  2 
(barriers  affecting  production),  together  yielding  a  range  of  8  - 10.5% 
(cf.  Commission  of  the  EC,  1988a,  pp.  180-182). 
The  decrease  in  extra-Community  imports  implied  by  the  direct,  static cost 
calculations  will  however  diminish  if  regarded  in  the  context  of  the 
economic  growth  brought  about  by  indirect,  market  integration  effects, 
which  will  also  benefit  producers  outside  the  Community.  In  the  end,  even 
though  intra-Community  trade  wi 11  expand  much  faster,  the  macroeconomic 
simulations  for  the  Cecchini  report  seem  to  suggest  that  extra-Community 
imports  could  increase  as  well  (cf.  the  calculations  in  Italianer  and 
Vanheukelen,  1989,  p.  344  fn). 
The  initial  trade-reducing  effect  of  the  removal  of  trade  barriers  and  the 
trade-enhancing  demand  increases  provoked  by  the  indirect  integration 
effects  have  led  to  mixed  reactions  from  the  Community's  main  trading 
partners.  Positive  reactions  are  associated  with  the  increase  in  economic -25-
activity  providing  opportunities  for  extra-EC  exporters  on  the 
Community-wide  market  (for  a  US  view,  see  Calingaert,  1988,  p.  82).  These 
reactions  arise  notably  from  the  industrialised  countries,  which  are 
well-equipped  to  compete  inside  the  Community,  even  though  it  has  been 
estimated  that  also  the  growth  rate  of  the  value  of  exports  of  developing 
countries  as  a  consequence  of  the  completion  of  the  internal  market  could 
increase permanently  by  1%  (cf.  Kol,  1989).* 
For  non-European  countries,  the  attitude towards  the  breakdown  of  the  NTBs 
inside  the  Community  per  se  is  one  of  benign  neglect:  one  cannot  deny  a 
group  of  countries  the  right  to  proceed  with  its  internal  economic 
integration,  and  as  far  as  this  results  in  higher  economic  activity,  the 
trade  diversion  effects  might  be  partly  of  wholly  compensated.  The  EFTA 
countries  regard  the  steps  at  further  integration  in  the  Community  from  a 
different angle:  while  the  degree  of  trade  integration between  the  EFTA  and 
the  Community  was  previously  roughly  comparable  through  their  free-trade 
agreement,  the  accelerated move  towards  integration  inside  the  Community  is 
considered  to  bear  costs  for  them  (cf.  Krugman,  1988,  and  Pintado  et al., 
1988).  Consequently,  in  the  context  of  the  European  Economic  Space  agreed 
between  the  EFTA  and  the  Community  in  1984,  ways  are  presently  being 
investigated through  which  EFTA  countries  could  participate in  some  aspects 
of  the  i nterna  1  market.  The  recently  concluded  negotiations  between  the 
Community  and  Switzerland  concerning  the  mutual  _access  to  each  other• s 
markets  for  non-life  insurance  companies  could  provide  an  example  for  such 
a  participation,  or  serve  as  a  blueprint  for  agreements  in  the  area  of 
services  in  the  framework  of  the  multilateral  GATT  negotiations,  for  that 
matter.  Quite  apart,  individual  EFTA  countries  could  apply  for  membership 
of  the  Community,  as  Austria  did  in  July  1989.  The 
11COSt
11  of  non-membership 
implied  by  the  internal  market  and  the  benefits of  membership  for  this 
* This  particular  calculation  seems  to  be  surrounded  by  uncertainty, 
however,  since  it assumes  a)  a  permanent  increase  in  the  growth  rate  of 
the  Community  and  b)  no  relative price effects. -26-
country  have  been  simulated  by  Breuss  and  Schebeck  (1989),  see  Table  9. 
Contrary  to  the  conclusions  reached  by  Krugman  and  Pintado  et  a  1.,  their 
simulations  suggest  that  the  effects  of  the  internal  market  for  Austria 
would  be  unequivocally  positive,  even  without  membership.  Given  that  the 
simulations  are  based  on  the  results of  the  Cecchini  report,  it is somewhat 
surprising  to  find  a  positive  effect  on  the  balance  on  current  account  in 
the 
11Status  quo''  scenario.  Closer  scrutiny  of  the  inputs  used  for  this 
simulation  reveals  that  net  real  exports  have  been  assumed  to  increase, 
contrary  to  what  was  implied  by  the  Cecchini  simulations  for  the 
non-Community  countries  on  average,  a  result  confirmed  by  Bakhoven  (1989), 
for  instance. 
The  neutral  stance  of  countries  such  as  the  United  States  and  Japan  with 
respect  to  the  dismantling  of  intra-Community  NTBs  has  initially  been 
overshadowed  by  fears  for  an  increase  in  barriers  towards  non-Community 
countries  (for  an  overview,  see  Henderson,  1989).  These  fears  mainly 
concerned  two  issues.  The  first  relates  to  the  problem  that it will  not  be 
possible  in  the  internal  market  to  maintain  intra-Community  border  controls 
ex  Art.  115  of  the  EEC  Treaty  in  order  to  impose  the  remaining  national 
import  quotas.  The  rna in  sectors  exposed  to  this  prob 1  em  are  those  for 
automobiles  and  textiles  (under  the  Multifibre Arrangement).  Often  the  fear 
is expressed  that  the  existing  national  quantitative  restrictions would  be 
transformed  into  Community-wide  restrictions  which  would  possibly  be  more 
severe  than  the  average  of  existing  restrictions.  Quite  apart  from  the 
desirability  of  new  Community-wide  restrictions  (e.g.  individual 
Commissioners  have  already  expressed  the  opinion  that  restrictions for  cars 
shou 1  d  disappear  in  the  1  ong  run) ,  they  wou 1  d  be  hard  to  defend  in  the 
context  of  the  GATT,  and  it  is  therefore  di ffi cult  to  imagine  how  the 
existing  restrictions  would  have  to  be  converted  on  a  Community-wide 
scale.  The  second  issue  concerned  the  liberalisation  of  the  services 
sectors  and  notably  fi nanci a  1  services,  or  more  generally  the  issues  of 
national  treatment  and  reciprocity.  At  present,  Community  countries  have 
granted  each  other national  treatment  in  the  area  of  services  (Art.  58  - 66 
EEC).  Progressively,  the  principle  of  national  treatment  will  be  replaced 
by  that  of  mutual  recognition,  combined  with  the  establishment  of  minimum -27-
Table  9:  Medium-term  macroeconomic  consequences  of  the  completion  of  the 
internal  market  for  Austria.  with  and  without  Community 
membership 
Percentage  differences 
Gross  domestic  product 
Deflator  private  consumption 
Deflator  GOP 
Real  disposable  income  households 
Labour  productivity 
Employment 
Absolute  differences 
Employment  (
1000) 
Budget  surplus  (%  GOP) 
Current  balance  (%  GOP) 
Status 
1.6 
-1.6 
-1.2 
1.7 
0.8 
0.7 
21 
0.4 
0.8 
guo  Integration 
3.5 
-5.2 
-5.2 
4.0 
1.9 
1.5 
43 
-1.1 
-1.3 
Source:  Breuss  and  Schebeck  (1989).  Integration  scenario  contains  effects 
of  internal  market  and  budgetary  consequences  of  membership, 
including  assumptions  about  indirect  tax  harmonisation. 
prudential  rules  applicable  throughout  the  Corrmunity.  In  the  most  widely 
discussed  example  so  far,  the  second  banking  Directive,  the  increased 
opportunity  for  banks  from  third  countries  to  exercise  activities 
throughout  the  Corrmunity  on  the  basis  of  establishment  in  one  single 
country  was  initially  1  inked  to  equivalent  access  for  Community  banks  in 
the  country  of  the  bank  seeking  access  (reciprocity).  In  the  final  version 
of  the  Directive,  on  which  the  Council  reached  a 
11 Common  position  ..  in  July 
1989,  the  lack  of  effective  market  access  for  banks  from  Community 
countries  in  a  third country  comparable  to  that granted  by  the  Community  to 
banks  from  that third country  is  no  longer  an  impediment  for  access  of  the 
latter,  but  could  be  a  reason  to  open  up  negotiations  with  a  view  to 
obtaining  comparable  competitive  opportunities.  Only  if  the  absence  of 
effective market  access  is accompanied  by  the  absence  of  national  treatment 
this  could  be  a  reason,  in  addition  to  opening  up  negotiations,  to 
temporarily  1  imit  or  suspend  any  pending  or  future  applications  for  a 
banking  licence.  Moreover,  there  would  not  be  any  measure  with  retro-active 
effect.  This  last clause  and  the  more  prudent  approach  towards  the  problem 
of  mutual  benefits  have  taken  away  a  considerable  amount  of  fear  with 
respect  to  possible  increases  in  outside  NTBs  alongside  internal 
liberalisation. -28-
6.  DYNAMIC  EFFECTS 
One  of  the  possible  sources  of  underestimation  of  the  welfare  gains  as 
ca 1  cul a  ted  for  the  Cecchini  report  are  the  dynamic  effects,  such  as  the 
effects  of  increased  competition-on  innovation  and  technological  progress. 
Another  dynamic  effect,  in  the  context  of  the  neoclassical  growth  model  of 
Solow,  is  that  the  increases  in  efficiency  which  form  the  basis  of  the 
welfare  gains  in  the  partial  equilibrium  analysis  exert  a  positive 
influence  on  savings  and  investment  and  therefore  on  the  steady-state  level 
of  the  capital  stock.  This  implies  that  the  initial,  comparative  static, 
effect  on  output  wi 11  be  supplemented  by  an  indirect  effect  through  the 
increase  in  the  steady-state  level  of  the  capital  stock.  Baldwin  {1989)  has 
attempted  to  quantify  these  additional  output  increases,  starting  from 
{comparative)  static  increases,  which  were  calculated  in  the  Cecchini 
report  to  lie between  2.5%  {direct  cost  of  barriers)  and  6.5%  (direct cost 
plus  integration effect). 
The  factor  by  which  the  static  output  increases  have  to  be  multiplied  in 
the  models  used  by  Baldwin  depends  on  one  crucial  parameter:  the  elasticity 
of  output  with  respect  to  the  capital  stock  in  a  Cobb-Douglas  type 
production  function  with  non-constant  returns  to  scale.  The  more  this 
elasticity  exceeds  the  value  of  the  traditional  capital  share  from  the 
growth-accounting  1  iterature  {say  0.3),  the  higher  is  the  multiplier.  As 
long  as  the  output-capital  elasticity  is  smaller  than  one,  there  is  no 
influence  of  the  efficiency gains  from  the  internal  market  on  the  long-run 
growth  rate.  The  dynamic  effects simply  multiply  the  static gains  until  the 
new  steady-state  level  is  reached.  This  additional  effect  is what  Baldwin 
calls  the 
11medium-term  growth  bonus
11
•  In  the  special  case  that  the 
output-capital  elasticity equals  one,  there  is  however  an  increase  in  the 
long-run  growth  rate of  the  economy. 
Baldwin  shows  that even  if the  capital-output elasticity equals  the  capital 
share  from  growth-accounting  literature {this  corresponds  to  the  absence  of 
economies  of  scale),  the  static  output  effect  has  to  be  increased  by  at 
1  east  something  1  ike  30%.  This  cone 1  us ion  is  reached  on  the  basis  of  a -29-
calculation of  dynamic  effects for  five  Community  countries.  The  ranges  for 
these  medi urn-term  growth  bonuses  are  given  in  Table  10.  Applying  these 
ranges  to  the  static gains  for  the  Community  as  a  whole,  the  total  (static 
+ dynamic)  welfare  gains  of  the  completion  of  the  internal  market  may  be 
seen  to  range  from  3.1%  (2.5%  multiplied  by  1.24)  to  15.3%  (6.5%  multiplied 
by  2.36).  On  the  basis  of  alternative  estimates,  Baldwin  even  finds  an 
upperbound  well  above  the  latter figure. 
In  the  special  case  of  the  output-capital  elasticity equal  to  one,  Baldwin 
obtains  possible  increases  in  the  long-run  Community  growth  rate  between 
0.28  and  0.92  percentage  points. 
It  should  be  stressed  that  the  Baldwin  results  have  been  derived  in  the 
context  of  the  neoclassical  growth  model  which  assumes  full  utilisation of 
resources  in  steady  state. Consequently,  they  must  be  seen  as  adding  to  the 
11potential
11  effects  of  the  internal  market,  and  more  particularly  in  a 
medium  term  context  as  the  adjustment  towards  a  higher  steady-state  level 
of  output.  But  even  when  sticking  to  the  lower  bound  of  these  estimates, 
they  seem  to  make  a  good  case  for  saying  that  the  Cecchini  results are  an 
underestimation  of  the  total  (static plus  dynamic)  effects. 
Table  10:  Increase  in  static  effect  on  GOP  needed  to  reach  new 
steady-state  level  (medium-term  growth  bonus),  percentages 
Lower  bound 
Upper  bound 
Source:  Baldwin  (1989). 
B  D 
38  36 
136  129 
F  NL 
30  35 
80  124 
UK 
24 
93 -30-
7.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
Should  it  be  concluded,  as  suggested  by  Kay  (1989),  that  the  real 
significance  of  1992  lies  in  the  hype,  rather  than  in  the  programme 
itself?  Obviously,  the  internal  market  programme  is  a  supply-side  rather 
than  a  demand-side  programme.  Contrary  to  the  latter case,  its effects are 
therefore  to  be  brought  about  by  the  private  sector  rather  than  the  public 
sector  (except  in  its  role  as  purchaser  of  goods),  with  an  emphasis  on  the 
opportunities  offered  to  firms  through  improved  market  access  and  enhanced 
competition.  In  order  for  the  private  sector  to  react  according  to  the 
1  ines  spelled  out  in  the  Cecchini  report,  the  internal  market  programme 
needs  credibility.  Only  in  that  case  will  economic  agents  adapt  their 
expectations and  change  their behaviour  accordingly.  The  credibility of  the 
programme  depends  on  the  determination  with  which  it is implemented  and  the 
economic  implications  which  it  embodies.  The  strong  political  will 
expressed  in  the  Single  European  Act  for  a  successful  completion  of  the 
i nterna 1 market  and  the  results  achieved  therein  over  the  past  18  months 
are  sufficient  proof  of  the  determination  with  which  the  implementation  of 
the  project  proceeds.  The  "Post-Cecchini"  1  iterature  as  reviewed  in  this 
paper  has  demonstrated  that  even  if  "realistic"  rather  than  "potential" 
economic  effects  are  calculated,  they  continue  to  have  macroeconomic 
significance.  Combined  with  the  fact  that  1992  seems  to  have  had 
non-negligible  influence  on  the  behaviour  of  economic  agents  both  in  1988 
and  1989  the  conclusion  seems  warranted  that  the  programme  itself  has 
gained  credibility over  the  last year-and-a-half. 
This  conclusion  is  not  meant  to  say  that  the  full  potentiality  of  the 
internal  market  has  yet  been  transformed  into  reality,  nor  that  the 
imp 1  i cations  of  the  i nterna 1 market  are  the  same  for  each  sector  or  for 
each  country,  be  it  inside  or  outside  the  Community.  This  points  to  the 
importance  of  the  role  of  accompanying  policies.  At  the  microeconomic 
level,  the  proper  functioning  of  product  and  factor  markets  should  be 
guaranteed  by  a  strong  competition  policy,  the  development  of  the  social 
dimension  of  the  internal  market  and  measures  to  combat  capital  movements 
purely  induced  by  motives  of  tax  evasion.  At  the  macroeconomic  level,  the -31-
progressive  steps  towards  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  provide  room  for  an 
increased  zone  of  monetary  stabi 1  ity  and  offer  the  perspective,  through 
increased  co-ordination,  of  a  further  move  towards  a  situation  of  full 
employment  of  resources,  thus  adding  to  the  dynamic  gains  of  the  internal 
market.  On  the  distributional  side,  the  poorer  regions  of  the  Community 
could  be  supported  in  obtaining  a  fair  competitive  position  and  the 
restructuring  processes  could  be  facilitated through  the  use  of  the  doubled 
structural  funds.  At  the  international  level,  the  Community's 
liberalisation  programme  may  contain  elements  (e.g.  national  treatment  for 
services)  that  could  serve  as  examples  in  multilateral  negotiations,  such 
as  in  the  Uruguay  round  of  the  GATT.  Furthermore,  it may  provide  a  stimulus 
for  further  integration with  the  Community's  main  trading  partners.  Seen  in 
this  way,  the  internal  market  would  rather  contribute  to  international 
trade  1  iberalisation  than  pose  a  threat  to  it.  Given  its  high  degree  of 
interdependence  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  this  role  of  the  Community 
seems  not  only  to  be  its own  choice,  but  also  its own  interest. -32-
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